It all started with this URL that came from a colleague. It was a piece by Stratfor, an American think-tank, on the fiscal deficit problems of Greece.
I read it and my first reaction was that it was interesting to read and it made sense too. I circulated to some friends in Europe, or more precisely, European friends. The replies received from three of them were very illuminating. I am posting them all here. That makes for a very long post. My apologies. But, I am aware that it makes the post long. Yet, I have chosen to do so.
For those of who read only English newspapers to understand what is going on in Europe, these are eye-openers. In their own ways, the three Europeans downplay the notion that Germany has lost out in the single-currency project and that it has only something to lose by ‘bailing out’ Greece. The facts speak otherwise. Germany, as a country that has resolutely and impressively enhanced its productivity since 1995, has benefited from a single European market. Its real effective exchange rate has depreciated despite the appreciation of Euro against other currencies in the world since 1999.
Therefore, hyperventilating English language commentators who gleefully predicted the collapse of the single currency found their arguments losing their key pillars.
Read the second comment by a European friend who says that this is one way to ‘democratically’ obtain political unification rather than a political union. He takes care to emphasize the process rather than the result.
As I said before, read the three responses I got. You would be wiser as I became too, on the topic.
Since the third of the comments ended with Japan, it is what we would turn to in the next post. Make that a second one from now, for we still have unfinished business with Europe
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Thanks for the mail, but I do not share many of the arguments. In fact, talking about a German “born to conquer” mentality is missing much of the point in the current crisis. In a way or another, the current EMU / Greece crisis brings us back to the discussions at the very beginning of the European Economic and Monetary Union, EEMU as the original name was. The blueprint was presented by Jacques Delors in 1988, the times of the Iron Curtain. The European Economic Union had just overcome “Eurosclerosis” and Delors used the momentum to bring forward the old idea of a single currency, basically building up on the Werner plan for monetary union that was withdrawn in 1979 (or so, during the second oil shock).
Right from the beginning, there were two camps: the Italians arguing that “convergence results from monetary union” and the Germans “convergence is the prerequisite for monetary union”. The Germans were pointing to the example of Italy. Although Italy had one currency for decades, the divergence between the poor South and the rich North widened over time. The German (Bundesbank and economic intelligentsia) always stated that the countries with poor fundamentals will suffer if you eternally fix exchange rates. The debate was in full swing when the Iron Curtain fell, and German Chancellor Kohl “sacrificed monetary authority (of the Bundesbank) to obtain the French backing for the Unification” (original comment of the German Bundesbank at that time). My way to look at it is still this old one: the German economy enjoys the largest domestic market and has thus a natural competitive advantage over the rest of Europe. The Single Market and the Single Currency is multiplying this advantage – there is no strategy of “economic combat” or another hidden agenda behind it. the only argument I do accept is that the German Mittelstand (SME entrepreneurs) are so productive that they can compensate for the huge mistakes and obstacles of their own government, such as 43% marginal tax rate for incomes as low as 53,000 Euros per year, very high Value Added Tax, trade union representatives in the board of large companies etc.
Going forward, we have to go back to the discussion of the EEMU (old definition) at introduction that was cut short by German Chancellor Kohl: if convergence is not the result of monetary union, how can you compensate for the divergence in productivity trends? In a way or another, for me Germany has not to bail out Greece, but to give back some of their windfall profits of EMU to the other members. The German government’s room to do so is limited, due to its own political deficits. Just to keep in mind as an example of Germany’s wrong economic policy: Germany still allows its Bundeslaender (States) to run the Landesbanken, although there is no raison d’être anymore since the creation of the German Bundesbank. The German Landesbanken(s) are generating losses every year, and WestLB gets multi-billion bailouts on a regular basis. Look at the situation of the health care: on average, a German is going to the doctor 18x per year, on average! All the service is free, including the dentist and many more things. They can afford this luxury because they benefit from the EMU.
The risk short term is that Germany is ready to make some concessions on very weak ground, i.e. accepts some form of guarantees for Greece without discussing how to compensate for the divergences in productivity etc.
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Hi Anantha,
I agree that this is a good piece of research. Some remarks:
I don’t think there are examples of monetary unions that have survived history without becoming political unions (the fathers of the monetary union, Schmidt and Giscard first, Kohl and Mitterrand later, might not have explicitly said so, but underneath…that was the idea)
Somehow this dilutes (and confirms the exaggeration of) the emphasis the author puts on the conflict of German interests with the rest of Europe: hey, nowadays we even have a German Pope…and i don’t think that is 100% attributable to the inscrutable ways of the almighty(i.e. some human action is also part of that story…)
A couple of days ago, RGE was mentioning that IMF should do bail-out because they are capable (have history) of imposing conditionality….
The real thing is to see if EU (certainly to a significant extent under the leadership of Germany) will be able to impose serious conditionality: this is what counts and – i think – here i tend to agree with author
So, maybe – without necessarily thinking that it was planned/conspired from the start – this is the way to “democratically” obtain political unification (note: I don’t mention the word union because i emphasize the process rather than the result):
Let them in and party (close to zero spreads at no cost)
Then present the bill…i.e. surrender fiscal sovereignty 10 years after surrendering monetary sovereignty
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In my view, this paper tries to dramatize current events with wrong and simplified assumptions. History is not always a Hollywood screenplay.
I agree with the point that “at this moment, European Central Bank liquidity efforts are probably the only thing holding back such a default. But these are a stopgap measure that can hold only until more important economies manage to find their feet.”
Moreover, the statement “letting the chips fall where they may, must be tempting to Berlin”, sounds convincing.
However, the following remarks concerning the text are necessary:
1. Today, neither mountains nor desert or oceans are important trade barriers; it’s the import tax.
2. Nobody wanted war in the 1930s beside Germany and the Soviets. Germany got the Rheinland, Sudetenland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Chamberlain still wanted peace (remember the famous Munich conference in 1938)
3. The funding of the EU is not just Germany’s historic favour/gift to the rest of Europe. A stable, prospering Europe creates the German export markets and it’s in Germany’s own interest. For the same economic reasons the US is protecting trade routes globally, supports failing states and created NAFTA and goes even to war.
4. The Maastricht Treaty bans a concerted EU/ECB bailout for Euro members (not non-euro EU member such as Hungary and Latvia), not a bilateral one. Moreover, the ECB could easily circumvent these rules by buying Greek bonds in the secondary market.
5. A default of Greece would not scuttle the EUR; it would make the currency union more credible.
6. The statement, “the only way out of economic destitution would be for them to leave the eurozone” is nonsense. The Latvian example shows that competitiveness can be achieved by cutting public salaries. Moreover, Greece will never leave the Eurozone. A reintroduction of the Drachma would lead to chaos, not export stimuli.
7. The text doesn’t mention the simplest version of getting rid of debt: a controlled default in the same way as dozens of countries had done this in the past. If a sovereign default is conducted in a proper way, an Argentinean scenario is the exception, not the rule.
8. The debt situation of European countries is serious, but not dramatic. Look at Japan.
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